his article considers the security aspects of communication between two management processes operating in different management domains; identifies two major risks: the security of information exchanged during the management association, and control of access t o the management information base (MIB); and enumerates the various threats that must be guarded against and possible methods of attack. Security techniques, including symmetric and public key cryptosystems, are employed in the design of a method of achieving a secure management association. A scheme of authorization control for MIB access is developed based on work carried o u t on the X.500 directory service.l
The management of an Open System's network resources takes place in the context of a Management Association. The resources themselves are controlled by an agent process which presents a view of these resources to the outside world as a number ofmanugedobjects, eachofwhichcontains anumber of attributes. T h e collection of objects presented to the outsideworld by the Agent is known as the management information base, or MIB. A manager process regulates the operation of the managed resources by engaging in a management association with the agent and instructing it to carry out simple operations such as GET/SET attribute, CREATE/ DELETE object, etc.,onelements of the MIB. Within a single management domain where all processing nodes and network links are under the control of the same administration, security is not such a critical issue. However, when the management association takes place across the boundary between two separate management domains, and make use of public data networks, security issues must be considered in greater detail.
one of the management systems is operating in a domain that is under the control of a network services provider, telecommunications administration, or PTT. The other management system is operating in a customers management domain.
This article considers the sequence of events that occurs when a fault is discovered at a network element that is apart of the customer's management domain, and where the cause of this fault lies with a network element or service under the control of the administration. In this instance, the customer's management application process (MAP) may form an association with the administration's complaint handling application and report the complaint by performingoperationson the remote MIB.
In certain cases, either party may wish to allow the other to selectively access a portion of its MIB. For example, the customer may wish to allow the administration to carry out tests involving equipment at the network access point, or alternatively, the administration may use this facility to advertize planned service outages. A characteristic of this form of communications is that it can take place at any time, and either party can assume the role of manager or agent. From a security perspective, this scenario poses two problems:
Security of information exchanged during the Control of access to the MIBs in each domain.
following sections.
association.
These two problems will be addressed in the 
De€ ense Mechanisms
n the above discussion, I have outlined some of the I possible forms of attack that an intruder may employ to compromise the security of a CMIS dialogue. I will now discuss the protection mechanism that should be put in place in order to defend against these.
PeerEntityAuthentication -W e n a CMIS-based management association is to be formed, the initiatingsystemsissuesanM-Ini tialize. Request primitive [2]. Associated with this primitive, are a number of parameters including the initiator reference, destination reference, and responder reference. Each of these references can contain a Systems Management Application Entity Title (SMAE-Title) that can be used to uniquely identify that entity. In addition, an access control parameter is also included that can be used to verify that t h e stated identify is valid. By making use of mechanisms based on public key cryptosystems (outlined later in this article), the source and destination systems can satisfy themselves as to the authenticity of the other party. They can also use the same mechanisms to be able to offer proof of the association taking place, in case the authorized party subsequently denies this.
Data Origin Authentication -In addition to
verifying the identity of the requesting application entity, we must also ensure that the transactions are being carried out from the correct location. This guards against such eventualities as: a legitimate user accessing the service at gun-point from a hostile system, or an illegitimate user who has somehow obtained the necessary security parameters to access the system [3]. The various references alluded to above contain presentation service access point (PSAP) addresses that can be used to verify the origin of the association.
Data Confidentiality -Each of the service requests that form part of CMIS map onto correspondingprotocol dataunits (PDUs) of the Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP)
[4]. These PDUs in turn map into those of the remote operations service elements (ROSE). An intruder intercepting a ROSE PDU will be able to gain full knowledge of the semantics of the original CMIS primitive. Accordingly, t h e content of these P D U s must b e enciphered for protection. It should be noted that this encipherment will not protect against attackby traffic analysis, and thiswill still need to be applied on a link-by-link basis.
DatahtegrityProtection -In order to guard against tampering with individual PDUs, or by replaying PDU sequences, the InvokeId and access control parameters that accompany each CMIS primitive can be used to ensure that both the content and sequence integrity of the message stream remains secure.The details of theuse of message digest codes will be out-lined later in this article.
Access Control-Having established a secure association between two management processes, the two parties are then enabled to manipulate each others MIBs. It is desirable to be able t o control access to the MIB, for example, allowing all users to GET the value of an attribute, but only a subset to perform the SET operation. The operation of the M-ACTION primitives will also need selective access control. These points are explored further later in this article.
Establishing a Secure Management Association
n a conventional association between two man-I agement entities, the initiating entity generates anM-INITIALIZE . R e q u e s t primitivespecifymg the other party. This is mapped t o a R e m o t e operations service element BIND primitive, which is in tum mapped to an A-ASSOCIATE . R e q u e s t primitive. This causes the destination user to receive anM-ini t i a l i z e . I n d i c a t i o n , respond with a M -I n i t i a l i z e . R e s p o n s e , which culminates with the initiating user receiving an M-I N I T I A L I Z E . Conf irm.Thisprocessprovides no protection against the types of attack specified earlier in this document. If, for reasons of security,we do not wish to allow associations to take place, unless satisfactory mutual authentication has been carried out, a more complex procedure is needed for association establishment. The following procedure adapted from [5] establishes authenticity using a challenge-response mechanism. If A is setting up an association with B: A generates a random number R and encrypts it with his secret key Da. He then sends Da(R) to B. B receives this, knows that it came from A, and unwraps it using A s public key. B then encrypts this using his secret key Db. H e then sends Db(R) back to A. When A receives this result, h e unwraps it using B's public key and verifies that it is equal to what was sent, i.e., that Eb(Db(R)) = R. If this is true, then A can be sure that B is who he claims to be. Note that the above procedure must be performed in both directions for two-way authentication to be established.
One possible means of achieving this is shown is Fig. 1 where two parties A and B wish to establish a management association. Each has a public key ( E a and Eh) and a prkrate key ( D a and Db). It is assumed that the public keys o f any entity can be obtained by requesting a certificate f r o m the X.500 Directory service. First A challenges B by sending i t a random number. B responds to thischallenge, and gcncrates ii new random number that is simultaneously used to challenge A. When A has responded to this second challenge, both parties can be confident that the other is who they purport to be.
One ufthe later stages in the process illustrated in Fig. 1 involves A sending a session This would normally he an encryption k ated with one of the symmetric key a1 such a s DES. This can be given to the presentationlaycr,whichwill use it toencrypt any subsequent traffic on thc association. This will ensure data confidentiality on the association thereafter.
Non-Repudiation of Management Operations
In the context of ii secure and confidential management association. o n e party niay invoke manthe other MIB. In the c;ise where either party wishes to guard against ii subsequznt denial that an operation w a s in\oked. provision m u s t be mxle to make operations nonrcpudiahle.
This can be achieved by computing ii message authcntication code (MA(') for the PDL associated with the management operation. This MAC can then be signed using t h e secret key of the invoker.Thc performer citn then keep the PDU colitents in a log and u h e i t later a s proof t h a t the invocation w a s requcstcil. In ackno\+leclging the PDU. the performer can include the same MAC signed with the private key of the performer. which can later be used a\ pr('"f('facknowledgnient. The only problem to be solved is how to include the signed M.AC i n the management PDCls. This can tic done in two w;iys:
Information c a n be included in e i t h e r t h e InvokeTDor AccessCont ro 1 (ifnormal Cbf I P PDUs. This strategy will work with the Get. Set and Action CMIS priniiti\,cs. but since the event-report scrvicc does not provide this. i t will not he possible to provide it with non-rcpudiation facility. There are propos:ils 131 t o extend the capahilities of the OS1 presentation Iaycr to dlow nonrepudiation to be applicd to any arbitrary PDU. Thi\ is ;I better solution.
agement operatioiis (GET. SXT, ACTION. etc.) 011
Secure Association Summary
The ahove discussion h a \ outlined t h e ways in which two in a ti ageni en t en t i t ie s niay e s t ab1 i s h ;I t i association with pee r-e n t i ty aut hen t i cii t i on. In the process of setting up an asxiciation, they can exchange a session key, and use this to ensure data confident i ti 1 it y and in t eg r i t 4' t h r o u g h o ut t h c session.
By the application of strctim ciphers 011 a link-bylink b a s i s . t h e y c a n achievc some protection against attacks by traffic analysis. Type o f ;iccess reyiicstcd ~ in the context t h a t w e ;ire considering. this ;iccess will be specificd by t h e typc o f operation being p e r f o r m e d :
(GET, SET. CREATE, DFLETE. etc.). !\s shown i n Fig. 3 , when an o p c r a t i o n is requested. these three iteni\\vill he combined according to ;in algorithm dictatcd by the security policy in !hrce. and will yield ;i ye4 or no deckion.
, 411 autIioriLationcontrol scliemcs;ireIia~edon the ahove principlei. Where they differ is in where the atti-ihutes relating to the suhject and olject are stored. The optimum location for these attrihutesuill dcpcnd on the pattern of iicccss (e.g., ratio of subjects t o objects) and on relativc importance of accesscriteria (e.g.. speed of authorimtion versus the case with which the :ittrihutes can h e updated.
One major goal in incorporatingatitliorization control into the OS1 management framework. is that it should he clone with the niininiuni of disruption to exist ing standards. A similar constraint was encountered bv the designers ot X.500-hasetl directory and the solution to that problem sceins highahle in a management contcxt. In the next section we will examine how designers of the X.500
imp I e in e n tat ion know t i ;is 0 U I P U add re sse d this problem. iincl a t how this iolution can be adapted to provide effective authorization control for it MIB.
QUZPU Security Model
The X.500 Dircctory Recommendations describe a method of implementing ;I distributed database cont;iiningdetaiIsofpcople~org;inizat. countries, application procesie\, and other entities of interest from ;I communications perspective. Its model for representing this information has many similarities to the \\ay in which management intomiation is represented in a n MIR, ancl indeed the X.500 recommendations exerted ii great inl'luence ovcr those drawing up the managemcnt htandards. Just as in an MIB, the items of interest in a directoryare represented as objects. Figure 3 shows a portion of t h e object class hierarchy defined in X.521 [ 6 ] . This i s very similar to suggested class hierarchies outlined for network management, such as that prepared hy the OS1 Network Management Forum [7] . In addition to this, guidelines were given in the form of a suggested directory information tree (DIT) structure, outlining how the objects in the tree should be related. A portion of this structure is also shown in Fig. 3 .
In order to incorporale authorization control into the QUIPU directory implementation [8] . a new object class called QuipuObject was defined, which describes a class that contained an acccss control list (ACL). Any object which inherits from this will also contain an ACL, allowing access to it to be controlled. In this way. the new feature of access control was incorporated into the directoryframeworkwithout necessitating any changes to the access protocol. WHAT specifies what the ACL refers to -this can be either the entire entry, a specific attribute, or the children of a node in the DIT. WHO describes the entities to whom this access mode applies. It can be specified as a group of distinguished names. a distinguished name prefix (e.g.. to give access to all persons within a given organization). the distinguished name to which the object itself refers, and all others. A C C E S S -C A T E G O R Y specifies the type of access permitted. This includes: compare, read, add. write. detect, and none. Theseelementsofthisaccesscontrol list have been selectedwith thc X.500 directoryapplication as a target. They can be adapted to the network management application area by taking into account the elements of service inherent in CMIS. Each element of the trio is now discussed in turn.
WHAT-Since an MIB is \tructured in a similar way to a DIT, the form ofthis part ofthe trio does not need to be altered.
W O -One of the categories of user referred to in thi5 element in the trio, is that referred to by the object itself. This is clearly applicable only to the directory. and should be omitted from a management version of this element. The ability to specify individual distinguished names, and prefixes is valuable in the management context, and should be retained, as should the other category.
In designing the security mechanism for the directory, no provision was made to designate a user as be-longing to a privileged category (e.g., SYS-TEM, OPERATOR).This was not feasible in the directory context, without having the mapping from distinguished names t o privileged attributes replicated in every directory service agent (DSA) participating in the directory. No such constraint exists in the management context, and the mapping of distinguished names to privileged attributes could be co-resident with the MIB.The WHO section of the ACLcan thus be extended to include arbitrary user categories.
ACCESS-CATEGORY-
The list of access categories specified for the X.500 directory is derived from the types of operations present in that service. A set of categories for management applications should include:
GET -the ability to perform a get operation. SET -the ability to perform a set operation. DETECT -the presence of this access categorywill dcterminewhethcr an attempt toaccess that attribute will result in a noSuchObj ect or an accessDenied error. ACTION -determines whether a specified action can be performed on the object. CREATE -controls the creation of new objects a5 children of an entry. DELETE-controls thedeletionof asingleobject, or all children of an entry.
NONE.

Summary
Authorization control can be achieved for access to MIBs by using a similar ACL implementation as that used in the QUIPU Directory implementation. With suitable modifications as outlined above, this approach provides a comprehensive means of controlling access to the MIB by authenticated users. with a minimum impact on other elements of the management framework.
Conclusion
n this article, I have outlined how the use of public I key cryptosystems can be combined with a modified association control mechanism to provide peer-entity authentication and non-repudiation between two management entities. I have further explored how encryption keys can be set on aper session basis to ensure data confidentiality and, when used in association with message authentication codes, and can provide protection against replay attacks or messages being tampered with.
This article has described a modified version of X.500 access control lists that can ensure adequate authorization control over an entities access to the MIB after authentication has taken place. The use of all of these mechanisms in combination can be used to ensure a secure management service that is resistant to many forms of attack. 
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